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Abstract: The convergence of need between improved clinical care and post genomics research 
presents a unique challenge to restructuring information flow so that it benefits both without 
compromising patient safety or confidentiality.  The CLEF project aims to link-up heath care 
with bioinformatics to build a collaborative research platform that enables a more effective 
biomedical research. In that, it addresses various barriers and issues, including privacy both by 
policy and by technical means, towards establishing its eventual system.  It makes extensive use 
of language technology for information extraction and presentation, and its shared repository is 
based around coherent “chronicles” of patients’ histories that go beyond traditional health 
record structure. It makes use of a collaborative research workbench that encompasses several 
technologies and uses many tools providing a rich platform for clinical researcher. 
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1 Introduction 
Our rapidly increasing ability to gather information at the molecular level has not been 
matched by improvements in our ability to gather information at the patient level. 
There is a strong convergence of need between current trends towards safer more 
evidence based patient care (e.g. [Kohn 2000]) and current trends in post-genomic 
research1 which seek to link molecular level processes to the progress of disease and 
the outcome of treatment . Both need to be able to answer the questions: What 
happened and why? What was done and why. Simple though these questions may 
                                           
1
 research on genomics – the study of genes and their functions- for translating the outcomes of 
the humane genome project into medical discoveries.  
Journal of Universal Computer Science, vol. 12, no. 1 (2006), 80-98
submitted: 6/5/05, accepted: 13/12/05, appeared: 28/1/06 © J.UCS
seem, they remain difficult to answer without recourse to manual examination of 
patients’ notes – a time consuming process whether the notes are electronic or paper.  
Yet without answers to these questions, it is difficult either to measure the quality of 
care or to investigate the factors affecting onset and recurrence of disease.   
The Clinical E-Sciences Framework (CLEF) project seeks to address key barriers 
to answering those questions. Its prime objective is to produce an end-to-end cycle 
that both improves information for patient care and results in a growing repository of 
pseudonymised patient data linked to genetic and genomic information that can be 
safely shared for biomedical research.  The emerging design presents a vision of 
effective safe information management serving both patient care and biomedical 
research.  
However there are various barriers and issues that need to be removed or 
addressed before this can be accomplished. We categorise the key barriers and/or 
requirements as follows:  
• Privacy, consent, and security – at all levels: policy, organisational structure, 
and technical implementation.  
• Information capture – information extracted from text as well as collected 
from structured records, reports, and results. 
• Information integration and ‘chronicalisation’ – to infer from a coherent 
history of events from the hundreds of diverse documents that make up the raw 
material of the patient record.  
• Information querying, analysis, presentation and summarisation – to make the 
information easily accessible to both practising clinicians and biomedical 
researchers with minimal specialist training.  
• Knowledge resources – to recognise the significance and interrelationships of 
events. 
• Standards for both data and metadata – to permit effective information 
sharing and re-use.  
Initially, the project focuses on cancer as a pilot area, however it aims to provide a 
model that might be used in many disciplines. Cancer has the obvious advantages of 
immediate links to post-genomic research and overall importance in the strategy of the 
NHS and most other health systems.  However, there are two less obvious features of 
cancer that make it a useful test case for prototype systems. 
• Cancer patients are seen repeatedly and their records summarised repeatedly, 
thereby giving rise to texts’ repetition that enhances the results of information 
extraction. 
• Cancer follows a relatively stereotyped course with clear index events: 
diagnosis, recurrence, death etc, which make alignment of patient histories 
relatively straightforward. 
Various methods and technologies are used in the project to address these 
barriers, issues or requirements. The rest of the paper attempts to describe these 
methods and technologies in more details.  
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2 Information flow 
The requirements and technologies are best understood in the context of the 
information flow that has emerged from the design process and is shown in Figure 1. 
Starting with the “Patient care and dictated text” at the top of the diagram, the 
flow is: 
• Capture of the information. Some information comes from dictated and 
transcribed text. Other information comes directly from hospital information 
systems – e.g. laboratory results, prescriptions, etc.  Initially the project 
focuses data drawn from one or two hospitals to limit complexities of required 
ethical approvals and diversities across medical record systems and rather 
enabling a potentially better focus on the concepts of the chosen pilot area. 
• Pseudonymisation of all information at the originating hospital by removal of 
overt identifying items – name, date of birth, etc - and by providing a CLEF 
entry identifier that can only be reversed by the provider (or their nominated 
trusted third party) . 
• Depersonalisation of the texts to remove any residual information that might 
risk identification – e.g. names of relatives, nick names, place names, unusual 
occupations, etc. Hence a requirement for reliable scalable techniques that are 
efficient, have high precision and able to handle different types of (input) data 
or text formats.  
• Information extraction of key information from the texts into predefined 
“templates”, possibly with the help of the context provided by the information 
already in the repository hence the requirement for the next point. 
• Integration into the health record repository of all information including 
laboratories, radiology, and genomic analyses. 
• Constructing the chronicle to infer a coherent view of the patient’s history. 
Typically the same information occurs in many different documents with 
different levels of granularity, clarity and sometimes conflicts that must be 
reconciled.  
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Figure 1: Basic CLEF Information Flow 
From this point the information can go in two directions. 
• For patient care - back to the clinicians in the form of summaries and reports 
for patient care which can be re-identified by the hospital, providing a concise 
up-to-date summary of a patients’ condition drawn from the provided  patient 
information. This is a prime request of clinicians for improving patient care, 
for instance. Because it requires re-identification of patients, this step can only 
occur at the hospital and after security controls have been stringently tested and 
agreed to be adequate. The project currently focuses on clinical data drawn 
from the Royal Marsden Hospital (RMH) to develop its initial theory, 
technologies and tools. Scaling up and generalising the project developed 
technologies to other hospitals, and domains is a next phase of the project.  
• For clinical research - on to the repository to be queried by researchers using 
the collaborative research workbench. 
Another potential direction for the information flow is that the information can be 
further enriched by the results of researchers’ queries, their workflows, interpretations, 
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curation and links to external information and thus becomes the basis for virtual 
communities of researchers. 
3 Methods and Technologies  
The focus is on the specific technologies which are currently barriers to obtaining and 
integrating clinical information. The following describes the used methods and 
technologies to overcome the obstacles outlined above. It relates to each of the 
respective parts of the information flow diagram shown in Figure 1, except that of the 
privacy and confidentiality where it was set as a policy framework in the project that 
took a significant amount of effort and time to complete the process, which as a 
repercussion caused delays in the initial stages of the project.  
3.1 Security, privacy, confidentiality, and consent 
As it is clear from the “stop signs” in Figure 1, much of the infrastructure involves 
privacy and security. The overarching requirement is a policy and oversight 
framework for privacy and consent. No technical solution can be perfect, so 
confidence in the organizational measures is the most critical single criterion for 
success. 
Furthermore, no technical solution can succeed without vigilance.  A key part of 
the policy is the obligation of care for all researchers to report potential hazards to 
privacy as part of the routine use of the repository coupled with technical measures to 
make it easy to do so. 
However, technical measures are required and the requirements potentially 
conflict. Pseudonymous identifiers must be secure but must also support a) linking 
from multiple sources, b) re-identification with consent by the healthcare provider c) 
withdrawal or modification of consent by the patient.  Both initial pseudonymisation 
and re-identification must be done solely within the hospital providing the 
information.  Therefore, two stages of pseudonymisation are at least envisaged: one 
for entry from the hospital level, a second for linkage and use within the repository 
itself. Combinations of trusted third parties and techniques from e-commerce (e.g. 
[Zhang 2000]) are being investigated. The project will eventually modify or develop it 
own algorithms suitable to the structure of the input data. Currently, to facilitate a fast 
transfer of raw data to the rest of the project, a non-sophisticated algorithm is used to 
pseudonymise the data at the hospital or data source. It removes mainly the patient 
identifying fields from patients’ records. This has been developed by the hospital to 
“fit” with the structure of its data and the deployed electronic record system. 
The use of text extraction requires that special attention be paid to removing 
identifiers from text using language technology – a process we term 
“depersonalisation” which uses well established techniques from “named entity 
extraction” [Gaizauskas 2003b] and related techniques [Taira 2002]. At the first stage, 
the corpus of records from deceased patients is used to check the effectiveness of the 
depersonalisation mechanisms, as a condition before using the records of live patients.  
A preliminary progress has been in the project towards this goal, however several 
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formative implementations and evaluations of the natural language based technique 
are yet to be done. [Gaizauskas 2003b] provides further details. 
The other side of the issue is the employment of statistical disclosure control 
technology (as a privacy enhancing technique) [Elliot 2002] to monitor and blur the 
output of queries to reduce the risk of deliberate or accidental re-identification through 
queries of the pseudonymised repository. No matter how well pseudonymised, de-
identified and depersonalised, there is always a risk that personal data can be re-
identified through sophisticated cross referencing, statistical or data mining 
techniques. This risk of such re-identification is well established and techniques to 
combat it are developing rapidly [Elliot 2002, Lin 2002, Murphy 2002, Sweeney 2002]. 
This technology focuses heavily on the assessment of risk in single, static and cross-
sectional datasets [Cox 2001, Domingo-Ferrer 2001]. A systematic risk assessment 
disclosure control methodology [Cox 2001] for the additional risks posed by multiple 
table releases will be employed to further to reduce the risk of re-identification. 
Privacy is relative to risk and consent.  All records in the repository contain 
detailed metadata on the level of consent granted for their use by patients. In fact, the 
project is significantly contributing to the existing efforts on creating agreed standards 
for metadata on consent within the community. See [Kalra 2003] a more detailed 
description of the privacy, confidentiality and security framework.  
3.2 Information Extraction & Language Technology 
Doctors dictate.  Much of the key information in clinical records continues, and will 
continue for the foreseeable future, to be contained in unstructured or at best 
minimally structured texts.  Hence a major part of CLEF is devoted to adapting and 
evaluating mechanisms for information extraction from text [Gaizauskas 1996, Friedman 
2002].  Four features of the cancer domain make information extraction feasible: 
a) the very limited sublanguage, even more so than for medicine as a whole 
[Friedman 2002]; 
b) much of the specialised information is in common with molecular biology 
which is a major target for current text extraction efforts e.g. [Swanson 1997, 
Gaiszauskas 2003b];  
c) the well defined list of index events and signs that allows the template for 
extraction to be well defined;  
d) the existence of multiple reports for most events.  
The existence of multiple reports is particularly important and has not been widely 
noted elsewhere to the best of our knowledge.  Cancer patients are seen over a long 
period of time and their records summarized repeatedly so that there are many parallel 
or near parallel texts – often 150 or more text documents per patient. What may be 
unclear or ambiguous in one text can be refined from others.  This is particularly 
important when dealing with records from a referral hospital where the system will 
usually start in the “middle of the story”.  For example, first document might simply 
mention breast cancer in the past, concentrating on the current recurrence.  A 
summary, later, might give a date for a mastectomy but no details of the tumour type.  
Eventually, perhaps after information from the referring hospital was received, a 
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definitive statement of the time, tumour, spread, and treatment might be found.  A 
more detailed description of the information extraction process can be found in 
[Gaizauskas 2003a]. 
3.3 “Chronicalisation”, Repository and Integration 
At the heart of architecture is the central EHR repository and “chronicle”. The need 
for creating the “chronicle” came out of the classic problem of electronic health 
records, i.e. to maintain a faithful, secure, non-repudiatable record of what healthcare 
workers have heard, seen thought and done [Rector 1995].  The EHR repository 
follows standards designed to achieve these aims – e.g. OpenEHR [Ingram 1995],  
CEN standard 13606 [CEN/TC 2003], and associated development of 
“archetypes”[Beale 2002]. However, the central issue for this research is different – to 
infer a single coherent view of each patients’ history from the myriad documents and 
data in the EHR and to align them with other similar patients in aggregates for 
querying and research.   
Furthermore, our interest is not only in the literal information in the documents 
but in their clinical significance – not only what was done but why.  It is not enough to 
know that the report of a bone scan claimed “only osteoporotic changes”. It is 
necessary to recognise that this indicates that there are “no bony metastases found”.  It 
is not enough to know that the patient was taken off chemotherapy, it is important to 
know what side effect or concurrent illness intervened. 
The compilation of a single coherent “chronicle” for each patient from distributed 
heterogeneous information that makes up the medical record is a major task.  At one 
level, the chronicle provides a clear presentation to clinicians and researchers of the 
course of one patient’s illness as shown in Figure 2.  At another they are data 
structures which can be easily aligned on “index events” – diagnosis, first treatment, 
relapse, etc.- and aggregated for statistical analysis to answer questions such as “Of 
patients with breast cancer with a particular genetic profile, what is the comparison of 
the time to first recurrence for those treated with Tamoxifen as against those treated 
with a new proposed drug regimen”.   “How many dropped out of each treatment and 
why?” “How many required supplementary therapy for the side effects of treatment 
and why?”  
Assembling the chronicle is therefore a knowledge intensive task that relies on 
inferences. The reliability of these inferences may vary, and it is essential to record 
not only the inferences but also the evidence on which they were based and their 
reliability. A graphical presentation of a chronicle developed manually as part of the 
requirements exercise is shown in Figure 2. A human observer can quickly infer many 
of the reasons from the juxtaposition of events; an effective computer based 
“chronicle” must capture those inferences. 
The “chronicalisation” process employs several algorithms to draw different types 
of information or data and assemble its overall content into individual patient 
chronicle structures. Drawing up chronicle temporal information is one of the initial 
indexing algorithms, for example, which has partially been completed. The description 
of this algorithm is beyond the scope of this paper, please refer to [Harkema 2005] for 
further details.  
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Figure 2: An individual patient chronicle in graphical form 
3.4 Collaborative Workbench 
For the data in the repository to be useful, it must be easily accessible to scientists and 
clinicians. A common workbench (see Figure 3) is employed that acts as the outer 
layer, interface and/or window that enables end users and researchers to access, 
analyse and examine the underlying information. The workbench hides the 
complexities of the underlying technologies such as information extraction, repository 
etc. while providing the necessary mechanism to enable easy use of the technologies 
and information.  It provides a coherent platform, with one “feel and look”, allowing 
tools developed within the project or if appropriate in other projects to be plugged 
within the platform. The workbench is built around several open source technologies 
while allowing remote secure access to the CLEF authorised users. An application 
web server, such as Apache Jakarta Tomcat [Apache 2005], is used for delivering web 
content, on top of which a portlet container, such as Gridsphere [Novoty 2004], is used 
to unify the interface and presentation layer of the workbench.  
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Figure 3: CLEF Workbench Main Portal web Interface 
Several special technologies have been developed within the workbench including 
security, auditing, and logging, and tools for query formulation and visualisation and 
results presentation and summarisation.  In addition, it includes tools that link to 
external available resources and relevant literature.  The security components are built 
on technologies developed by other projects, such as Shibboleth and PERMIS 
[Chadwick 2003] for authentication and authorisation mechanisms, and use PKI 
infrastructure for secure encrypted transmission of data.  
 
 
Figure 4: CLEF workbench overall architecture 
 
The general CLEF architecture for the workbench framework is shown in (the 
overall diagram) Figure 4. In addition to others It highlights some of the (sub) 
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components or services that the workbench framework includes and/or provides. 
These briefly include: user and session management services, portal services, tools 
and users administration services, authentication and authorisation services, query 
formulation and visualization services, auditing and logging services, and relevant 3rd 
party services. Also other services such as hazard monitoring, statistical analysis are 
planned to be implemented or integrated at later stages. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: CLEF workbench (portal) architecture 
3.4.1 The workbench architecture 
Figure 5 presents the CLEF workbench portal architecture. CLEF workbench consists 
of two main parts: the CLEF portal and the portlet container. The CLEF portal itself is 
made up of a collection of interface and service portlets classified, combined and 
structured to provide the main CLEF functions. The portlet container holds these 
portlets and other services, and is the main used underlying framework for integrating 
various CLEF (and 3rd party) components. The content delivery is done by the 
servlet-container Apache JakartaTomcat. The (end) user interface is provided by a 
single or combination of portlets, depending on the respective service or functionality. 
One of the main advantages of portlets is that they are able to handle rich visual 
interface controls, including direct mark up fragments, or those generated by a Java 
scripting language (JSP). The underlying business logic is either implemented as 
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service portlets (or servlets) within the workbench layer or aided by service portlets 
that communicate content from external services. Although there are limitations on the 
level of sophistication of user interfaces, especially graphical user interfaces, the 
workbench architecture has the flexibility of implementing the underlying business 
logic in various J2EE compliant technologies including EJB, or can potentially utilise 
WSRP to incorporate remote content and/or services.  
The workbench includes a service communication interface (or API) that 
communicates with external CLEF (local or remote) components, such as the 
knowledge base or the Information extraction components. It supports various 
communication mechanisms, including RMI and WSRP to support legacy components 
and web services respectively. The workbench framework is extensible to incorporate 
other 3rd party components, such as prolog, or database engines. The following 
sections describe the CLEF workbench services and components in more details. 
3.4.2 The workbench structure and content  
The structure and the content are combined together to provide a coherent CLEF 
portal with one “feel and look” (see Figure 3).  Because of the medical data sensitivity 
and CLEF security constraints, the content in the portal has been classified in three 
different general categories: 
• Public-type content: at the top level, the portal includes information accessible 
by CLEF portal visitors, with minimal security constraints. Information related 
to the domain knowledge, the project end-user services, ethical and 
confidentiality framework are included at this level. Also general CLEF 
services, such as request user registration, request general support or 
information, are available as part of this category. Other CLEF unique general 
output information, or related news or events are also included under this 
category.  
• CLEF-general-registered-users type content: this type of content is only 
accessible by authenticated registered users. CLEF users related information, 
general guidelines, CLEF related events, news, standards etc, are available at 
this level. Also, user and portal related services, (e.g. user preferences 
customisation), CLEF general services (e.g. request upgrade of user access 
level, search services, related external resources etc) are included under this 
category.  
• CLEF-special-content: access to clinical information through query 
formulation/submission is available under this category. Access to this type of 
category (content and services) requires ethical approval, by CLEF’s ethical 
approval committee. There are many special sub-services available under this 
category, e.g. per projects, teams, organisations and/or individual cases. 
However, content and/or sub-services under this category is being further 
refined by the CLEF ethical and confidentiality team as the project develops 
depending on users requirements and types of access. Also the CLEF ethical 
and confidentiality team continually assesses and/or categories each newly 
developed portal service, based on the content it accesses or provides. 
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The overall layout/structure of the CLEF portal has been designed based on these 
categories. These categories also defined the layout of each sub-part of the CLEF 
portal. Some areas of the portal are constraint by the provided end-user configurable 
layout or interface. Also content and services are sequenced (or put in workflows) 
differently and put in an optimal user interfaces and layout to achieve or perform a 
particular operation or unit-of-work, for different types of users (e.g. specialist clinical 
researchers, general users) depending on their privileges and type of function. 
3.4.3 The workbench user and session management services 
Another important feature of the workbench is that it has the capability to manage 
CLEF users. In addition to collecting demographic information, and establishing roles 
or privileges, which are then mainly used to authenticate users and set their 
authorisation levels, users must go through a registration and approval process before 
they are given access.  
Researchers must be accredited by the Ethical Oversight Committee to gain 
access through the workbench to anything except pre-computed results and metadata.  
Despite other precautions, it is assumed that if individual records can be read in detail, 
there is the risk of identification. Therefore, all information is treated with as if it were 
identifiable[Kalra 2003]. Most researchers will be accredited only for performing 
queries that generate aggregated results controlled through the disclosure control 
technologies. Special permission of the Ethical Oversight Committee is required to 
gain access to individual patient records even though they are pseudonymised.  
The user management in CLEF is not limited to the workbench, but also the whole 
system including the underlying data sources and services. Handling multi-user 
sessions simultaneously while keeping session instances separate across services and 
portlets is critical for the workbench. This is handled by the session manager. The 
following functions or services are provided by the user and session managers: 
• User registration: this service allows new users to request to become CLEF 
registered users or existing users to upgrade their registration levels where 
appropriate. 
• User types, roles and privileges: this service allows creating and setting 
different types of users (clinical research, clinicians, bioinformatician etc), 
allocated different access levels or roles with different access privileges. 
• User workspace and preferences: this service allows creating individual and 
team workspaces for registered users. Also it allows users to set their own 
preferences or customise their workspace to include different preferred 
services, tools or content. 
• Team, project, organisation management:  this service allows managing a 
group of users as one unit, with common or separate workspaces that allow 
bringing together relevant services, tools and content. In some cases, the team 
leader might be given privileges to manage his/her own team, especially if it is 
part of an organisation or research institute with more than one team. This 
feature is important for cumulative submitted queries and previous queries 
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submitted by all team members to enable effective functioning of the statistical 
disclosure component (SDC) to determine subsequent queries output. 
• User environment: this service allows users to customise their environment to 
select for example different colours, schemes or organisation or layout of 
interface portlets. 
• Session control attributes:  this service controls session attributes, such as 
timeout of sessions with relation to user login and logout services, while 
keeping separate multi-user instances. 
• Session log: logging user interactions with the workbench, such as services 
invoked, type of information viewed and so forth. Logging patterns of work 
adds more control, enhance the interface and help the support team to track and 
trace problems, for user support teams. 
3.4.4 The workbench query formulation and visualisation tools 
The other important part of the workbench is the query formulation and visualisation 
tools.  We are experimenting with a variety of textual and graphical query and 
visualisation interfaces to the repository. However, the prime interface for researchers 
is being designed around techniques from language generation known as 
WYSIWYM –“What you see is what you meant”[Power 1998, Bouayad-Agha 2000]. An 
example is given in Figure 6. 
The WYSIWYM interface allows users to expand a natural language like query 
progressively to produce queries of arbitrary complexity and then summarises the 
results, again in generated natural language. These interfaces are provided in different 
portlets and accessible by users depending on their access control privileges. They 
provide several types of queries and different ways of displaying results, e.g. 
graphical, textual,  tabular etc. 
3.4.5 The workbench Security and access control  
The security components of the workbench, i.e. authentication and authorisation are 
part of the overall CLEF security system. The authentication service enables 
registered to login in the workbench to access common general-user type information 
and services. The authorisation service determines access rights and privileges in 
terms of allowed services and related content.  Users privileges are set and determined 
by the user registration and approval process including the intended purpose of using 
CLEF by the user. The description of CLEF security, ethical and confidential 
framework is beyond the scope of this paper. See [Kalra 2003] for further details.  
As mentioned above, CLEF security approach is built on technologies based on 
Shibboleth, FAME and PERMIS technologies. The workbench authentication is 
provided through Shibboleth and FAME with a single sign on (SSO) service 
integrated with the portal user interface. Authorisation is a role-based access control 
provided by PERMIS and governed by CLEF security policy. Their functionality and 
approach are described in more details in [Chadwick 2003]. 
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Figure 6: Example of WYSIWYM query formulation and result visualisation 
3.4.6 The workbench information auditing/logging services  
Another functionality of the workbench is storing information about various functional 
and user aspects, such as those related to user submitted queries, accessed information 
and services. Some of the stored information can be used by the SDC component, for 
instance to determine the output results of some of the submitted queries. The 
workbench information auditing component is linked to the data sources (knowledge 
base) information auditing components and the overall system provenance type 
information component. It audits/logs these three types of information, although the 
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implementation is incrementally expanding to include finer details and potentially 
others.  
• Invoked services, content and support questions: it stores information about the 
viewed information and invoked services. This type of information is useful, 
not just for the session manager mentioned above, but also on a longer term for 
improving the structure/layout of the workbench, studying users patterns of 
work and overall security system enhancements.  
• Submitted queries and analysed data: this is mainly collected for the SDC 
component which requires access to previously submitted queries to determine 
the appropriate output/decision. This information is collected by both auditing 
services within the workbench and the knowledge base.  
• Provenance-type information: This is collected in varying degrees, however 
because CLEF and also the workbench consist of many services, and portlets 
(which some are an aggregation of more than one service), provenance 
information is useful for debugging technical and analytical aspects of the 
system and workflows in the system.  
3.5 Knowledge resources required 
All the key technologies in CLEF are knowledge intensive. The overall approach is 
based on “ontology anchored knowledge bases” – knowledge bases anchored in 
common conceptual models but conveying additional domain knowledge about the 
concepts represented. Examples include which drugs are used for which purposes, the 
significance of different results from different studies, the fact that a seemingly 
positive finding such as “evidence only of degenerative changes” may in practice 
convey the negative information that “no metastases were found”.  Some of this 
information exists in established resources such as the UMLS [UMLS 2004].  
However, most of it needs to be compiled.   
The repository is intended to be more than simply a data collection. Rather it is 
intended, in the spirit of “collections based research and e-Science” to be a repository 
of both data and what the interpretations of that data by various researchers, their 
conclusions, and the methods they have used to achieve them. In this, it requires 
intensive metadata of at least five types: 
• Resource discovery information: what is in the repository and what services does 
it provide. 
• Provenance information: where information came from, the evidence for any 
inferences, and the uncertainty of the information. 
• Usage and workflow information: how the information has been used, including 
information allowing monitoring potential compromises of privacy. 
• Consent and sensitivity information about what information may be included in 
queries for different purposes. 
• Clinical significance and consequences: why things were done and what they are 
believed to mean, always annotated by provenance metadata. 
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The first three are shared much in common with clinical trials, and some of the 
metadata schemas must take into account the emerging standards for clinical trial 
metadata [CDISC 2004]. The fourth and fifth types of metadata are more specific to 
the biomedical and heath care focus. 
4 Discussion and Conclusion 
The convergence of need between post-genomic research and improved clinical care 
presents a unique opportunity; realising that opportunity suggests a radical 
restructuring of information flow and integration. The demand for large shared 
repositories of clinical and genomic information data is now clear. In the UK there are 
at least three other major initiatives: BioBank, the National Cancer Research 
Institutes/Department of Health National Translational Cancer Network, and the 
National Cancer Research Network [Biobank 2004]. 
Paradoxically, the genomic information is easy to capture. Although there will be 
increasing amounts of structured clinical data, experience suggests that much clinical 
information will continue to be dictated.  Currently, this information can only be 
captured by labour intensive use of “data managers”.  Scaling this effort up manually 
is too resource intensive to be plausible. Fortunately, the many parallel texts and 
stereotyped course of cancer make it a particularly good area for information 
extraction. 
The sheer size, complexity, and repetition in cancer records make direct use of 
traditional electronic health records problematic and inefficient.  Thus a coherent 
“chronicle” of patient histories is placed at the centre of the repository. The notion of 
“chronicle” owes much to ideas of “abstraction” developed in connection with 
guideline research [Rector 2001, Shahar 1997] and the notion of a “virtual patient 
record” in the HL7.  The clear focus of the approach on “What was done and why?”, 
“What happened and why” should contribute to these broader efforts as well as to its 
prime goal - to use clinical information intelligently and effectively for both patient 
care and post-genomic research. 
CLEF, through its workbench, developed technologies and underlying services, 
provides a coherent collaborative research environment that enables clinical and other 
researchers to safely and securely analyse, examine and query the underlying 
pseudonymised clinical information, drawn from operational electronic health records. 
The operational CLEF collaborative research system provides the infrastructure and 
tools and can be used by both, world wide by, remote authorised users and can be 
deployed in hospitals and used by in house clinicians to aid patient health care.  
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